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ST. GEORGE TUCKER'S LAW PAPERS
CHARLES F. HOBSON*
St. George Tucker led a productive life in law that began on his
native island of Bermuda before the American Revolution and came
to a close more than five decades later in his adopted state of
Virginia.' After an unhappy experience reading law with his uncle,
Bermuda's attorney general, Tucker eventually made his way to
Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1772 and entered The College of William
and Mary, where for six months he took general academic courses
in the schools of natural and moral philosophy.2 He then left the
college and resumed the study of law with George Wythe, a
practitioner and teacher of great reputation in the colony.3 Tucker
gained admission to the bar of the county courts in 1774 and of the
General Court in 1775, but the American War of Independence
effectively postponed his law career for seven years.4 After the war,
he commenced practicing in the county courts in the Petersburg
vicinity and by the mid-1780s was attending the commonwealth's
superior courts in Richmond.' At this time he rapidly acquired a
"considerable reputation, respected by all the court and bar,"6
which led to his election in 1788 as a judge of the General Court.7
* Editor, The Papers of John Marshall, and Resident Scholar, William and Mary School
of Law.
1. For biographical information about Tucker, see generally MARY HALDANE COLEMAN,
ST. GEORGE TUCKER: CITIZEN OF No MEAN CITY (1938); CHARLEs T. CULLEN, ST. GEORGE
TUCKER AND LAW IN VIRGINIA, 1772-1804 (1987) [hereinafter CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAW]
(published version of 1971 Ph.D. dissertation); Charles T. Cullen, St. George Tucker, in
LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH 657-86 (William
Hamilton Bryson ed., 1982) [hereinafter Cullen, St. George Tucker]; John Randolph Tucker,
The Judges Tucker of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1 VA. L. REG. 789 (1896).
2. CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAw, supra note 1, at 6-9.
3. Id. at 9.
4. Id. at 14-16, 22-24.
5. Id. at 24, 55.
6. Daniel Call, Biographical Sketch of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call)
at vii, xxvii (1833).
7. CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAW, supra note 1, at 63.
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Tucker's judicial appointment coincided with a major reorganization
of the commonwealth's courts, which, among other changes, divided
the General Court's jurisdiction among eighteen (later nineteen)
district courts dispersed throughout the commonwealth.8 From
1789 to 1803 Tucker attended the spring and fall terms of the
district courts and also the twice yearly sessions of the General
Court, at which the district judges sat en banc to consider certain
cases. In 1804, he was promoted to the Virginia Court of Appeals,
where he sat for seven years before resigning in 1811. 9 After a brief
retirement from law, Tucker accepted President Madison's appoint-
ment as judge of the U.S. District Court in 1813, in which capacity
he also sat with Chief Justice John Marshall on the U.S. Circuit
Court for Virginia.10 He tendered his resignation as a federal judge
in 1825, two years before his death.11
The years from 1789 to 1803 were the most active and prolific of
Tucker's law career. In addition to holding court regularly in
distant parts of the commonwealth, Tucker had a leading part on
a commission to complete the revisal of its laws (a project begun a
decade earlier under Thomas Jefferson's direction), which resulted
in the publication of the commonwealth's first code in 1794.12 In the
spring of 1790, he succeeded George Wythe as Professor of Law and
Police at The College of William and Mary.13 During intervals
between court terms, Tucker conducted his law course, which he
organized around William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws
of England.4 In his lectures, Professor Tucker took great care to
point out the departures from English law that had taken place in
Virginia and the United States, making it necessary to modify if not
discard Blackstone at many points.15 He eventually incorporated
the substance of his lectures in a series of notes and appendices to
his own edition of Blackstone, published in 1803 as Blackstone's
Commentaries: With Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and
8. Id. at 72-73.
9. Cullen, St. George Tucker, supra note 1, at 685.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAW, supra note 1, at 95-110.
13. Id. at 116-17; Cullen, St. George Tucker, supra note 1, at 661.
14. CULLEN, TUcKER AND LAW, supra note 1, at 119-20.
15. See Cullen, St. George Tucker, supra note 1, at 662-63.
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Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the
Commonwealth of Virginia. Each of the five volumes of this edition
had appendices "containing short tracts upon such subjects as
appeared necessary to form a connected view of the laws of Virginia
as a member of the federal union."16 Tucker's Blackstone soon
became the leading American law text of the day, enjoying wide
circulation in Virginia and throughout the nation. His work was not
only the first major treatise on American law but also the first
commentary on the U.S. Constitution-indeed, it stood unsurpassed
in these respects until Lhe appearance of the great works of James
Kent and Joseph Story in the 1820s and 1830s. Although it has long
since ceased to be an essential text for aspiring law practitioners,
Tucker's Blackstone continues to be held in the highest regard by
legal and constitutional historians as an indispensable source for
understanding American law and the Constitution in their forma-
tive era. The work has an abiding value and continues to be
reprinted, most recently in 1996.17
Tucker's renown in American law rests on the secure foundation
of his edition of Blackstone. This Essay considers a less familiar but
scarcely less imposing literary monument Tucker bequeathed to
posterity: the vast corpus of law papers he generated as a working
lawyer and judge from the 1780s to the 1820s. Tucker operated at
every level of Virginia's court system, from county court lawyer to
judge of the Court of Appeals, and spent the last dozen years of
his career as a federal judge. His legal manuscripts include notes
of arguments, opinions, correspondence, memoranda, pleadings,
dockets, and numerous other papers relating to the cases he argued
and heard in the various courts. The bulk of these papers survived
the vicissitudes of time to find a permanent resting place as part of
the magnificent Tucker-Coleman Papers in the Special Collections
16. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OFVIRGINIA tit. p. (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803)
[hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES].
17. Id. The edition contains an introduction by Paul Finkleman and David Cobin. The
Lonang Institute has published an online version of the work. See Blackstone's
Commentaries: With Notes of Reference (1803), http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/tucker/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2006).
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of the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and
Mary.
I. TUCKER'S MANUSCRIPT CASE REPORTS
The heart of Tucker's law papers consists of three bound
manuscript volumes of case reports, which he entitled Notes of
Certain Cases in the General Court, District Courts, and Court of
Appeals in Virginia, from the Year 1786 to 1811.18 In his "introduc-
tion" Tucker wrote: "These notes being many of them taken in
Court have no other pretensions to accuracy, than so far as they
contain my own opinion as delivered in the various Cases that have
occurred in the Courts of which I was a Judge."'9 He went on to
observe that he took his notes in small notebooks of about "half a
Quire of paper." ° Tucker's notes eventually filled thirty-three
notebooks totaling some sixteen hundred pages. He had them bound
together in volumes, he said, in order to preserve them for his own
use and that of his family.2' These three volumes contain reports of
nearly eleven hundred cases. About six hundred of these were cases
in the General Court and district courts heard between October
1786 and November 1803. Tucker recorded these reports in the first
nine notebooks, and a part of the tenth, which compose most of the
first volume. From the spring of 1804 until his resignation in April
1811, Tucker reported about five hundred cases in the Court of
Appeals. These reports fill twenty-four notebooks that compose the
second and third volumes.
The manuscript volumes had a use and circulation beyond Tucker
and his immediate family, which included sons Henry St. George
and Nathaniel Beverley, both of whom achieved prominence as
lawyers and professors of law. Most notably, Daniel Call, the
reporter of six volumes of Virginia cases, borrowed Tucker's notes
in 1825 for the purpose of filling in the gaps of unreported Court of
18. St. George Tucker, Notes of Certain Cases in the General Court, District Courts, and
Court of Appeals in Virginia, from the Year 1786 to 1811 [hereinafter Tucker, Case Notes]
(unpublished Tucker-Coleman Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The
College of William and Mary).
19. Id. at intro.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Appeals cases since that court's inception. The manuscript served
as the principal source for the cases reported in Call's fourth, fifth,
and sixth volumes, published in 1833.22 As a lawyer, Call cited
Tucker's reports in cases he argued years before he used them for
his own reporting project. Two criminal cases heard in the General
Court, one in 1786 and the other in 1798, were reproduced directly
from Tucker's notes, without attribution, in the first volume of
Virginia Cases, published in 1815.2" As late as 1869, a lawyer
arguing in Virginia's Supreme Court cited the source of a case
report as "1 Tuck. (manuscript) Notes of Cases 23."24 The same
lawyer cited "1 Tuck. MSS. 388" in an article in the American Law
Review.25
At some time in the nineteenth century, the volumes passed out
of the Tucker family, only to be returned in 1880. An inscription on
the flyleaf of the first volume reads: "Bequeathed by the late
William Green to his brother James W. Green and by him pre-
sented to the Hon. J. Randolph Tucker. Oct. 21st 1880."26 William
Green was the lawyer who cited Tucker's manuscript reports. Son
of a judge on the Virginia Court of Appeals, Green achieved renown
as an appellate advocate and author of scholarly legal articles. 7 The
annotations scattered throughout the Tucker volumes have been
identified as being in Green's distinctive hand.28 How long the
volumes were in Green's possession before his death is not known.
They were given to Green by Judge William T. Joynes,29 who served
on the Virginia Supreme Court from 1866 to 1873. How and when
Joynes obtained the volumes is a mystery that has not been solved.
After their return to the Tucker family in 1880, the volumes
22. Call dedicated his fourth volume to Tucker in the form of a letter written in 1827,
shortly before Tucker's death. Letter from Daniel Call to St. George Tucker (May 1, 1827),
in 8 Va. (4 Call) dedication p. (1833).
23. See MISCELLANEOUS VIRGINIA LAW REPORTS, 1784-1809, at iv, xxxvi (W. Hamilton
Bryson ed., 1992).
24. Moon v. Stone, 60 Va. (18 Gratt.) 130, 321 (1869).
25. William Green, Stare Decisis, 14 AM. L. REV. 609, 645 n.8 (1880).
26. 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18.
27. Gilbert E. Butler, Jr., William Green, in LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979:
A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH, supra note 1, at 265-68.
28. Lee Shepard of the Virginia Historical Society kindly supplied the author with a
document in Green's hand for the purposes of comparison.
29. See Tucker, supra note 1, at 792.
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evidently passed from one branch to another before they were
donated to The College of William and Mary in 1938 by Mr. and
Mrs. George P. Coleman. George P. Coleman was a descendant of
Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, and J. Randolph Tucker was a son of
Henry St. George Tucker.
For years, Tucker's volumes lay dormant in the Earl Gregg Swem
Library, uncatalogued and virtually unknown to researchers. Not
until the late 1960s were they, in effect, rediscovered, thanks to the
probing investigations of a young graduate student, Charles T.
Cullen, who was then writing a dissertation on Tucker.30 From
his research, Cullen knew that Tucker had compiled case reports
and that they had been bound together in manuscript volumes.
His efforts to uncover them, including repeated inquiries to the
Special Collections staff, only brought frustration. He even went
to Lexington, Virginia, on the likely supposition that J. Randolph
Tucker, a law professor at Washington and Lee, had given them
to the university. Finally, back at Swem Library, staff member
Margaret Cook asked Cullen to look at some dusty volumes she had
come across among the uncatalogued papers. Cullen immediately
recognized them and experienced the rare and sublime pleasure of
knowing that a scholarly treasure, once despaired of as lost, had
been found.31
In taking notes of cases, St. George Tucker was by no means
unusual among his contemporaries at the bar, at least those who
practiced in the superior courts. Indeed, at a time when Virginia
cases remained unreported and unpublished, lawyers and judges
were their own reporters, jotting down the facts of the case,
summarizing the arguments of counsel, and, most importantly,
preserving a memorandum (or perhaps obtaining a copy) of the
court's opinion. As Bushrod Washington noted in the preface to the
first published volume of Virginia Court of Appeals cases, the
reports were simply an extension of the notes kept for his personal
30. Cullen's 1971 Ph.D. dissertation was later published. See CULLEN, TUCKERAND LAW,
supra note 1.
31. The author thanks Dr. Cullen for his recollections. A typescript of Tucker's
manuscript volumes prepared under Cullen's direction was indispensable in preparing this
Essay. Margaret Cook, recently retired as curator of manuscripts and rare books at the Earl
Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary, also provided valuable assistance.
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use, "without any view to a publication."32 Until the reports began
to be published, bar and bench cooperated with each other in
circulating their notes, memoranda, and opinions. We know from
citations in cases heard in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries that lawyers relied on manuscript reports, including
reports of cases in the colonial General Court. Most of these
manuscripts have long since been lost or destroyed. No trace
remains of what must have been a voluminous set of notes kept by
John Marshall.33 The few surviving manuscript law reports of
Virginia cases from this period, exclusive of Tucker's, have recently
been published by W. Hamilton Bryson.34 The extraordinary feature
of Tucker's reports, apart from the fact that they have survived, is
the depth of detail in the reporting and the lengthy span of time
embraced by the reports. In these respects, they far surpass those
uncovered by Professor Bryson.
Along with the bound manuscript volumes of case reports, a vast
quantity of loose papers relating to the cases is preserved in the
Tucker collection. Much of this material has remained largely
unstudied because the brief catalog descriptions fail to alert
researchers to the treasure trove that lies within. For example, the
catalog lists Tucker's docket books but provides no details about
their contents. Ordinarily, court dockets, which provide a schedule
of cases to be heard at a given term of a court, might not be of much
interest. Tucker, however, used the blank sheets of his docket books
to report cases, take notes of arguments, and draft opinions. The
notes he made in his dockets were the raw material from which he
fashioned the report he later entered in his notebook. The finished
report often condensed or omitted what he had originally written
32. 1 BUSHROD WASHINGTON, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT
OFAPPEALSOFVIRGINIA, at intro. (Richmond, Nicolson 1798). The earliest published Virginia
reports were George Wythe's volume of cases in the High Court of Chancery (1795), followed
by Washington's two volumes (1798, 1799) and Call's first three volumes of Court of Appeals
cases (1801, 1802, 1805).
33. We know that Marshall compiled reports because Call borrowed fifteen of Marshall's
cases and published them in the appendix to his third volume and published one other case
in his fourth volume. Although Call did not identify Marshall by name as the source of these
reports, Tucker cited "Marshall's reports 3: Call 556" in a note to one of his General Court
cases. See 5 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 454-55, 473-74 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds.,
1987) [hereinafter MARSHALL PAPERS].
34. See MISCELLANEOUS VIRGINIA LAW REPORTS, supra note 23.
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down. Although he took extensive notes of the lawyers' arguments
in his dockets, Tucker typically entered only brief summaries of the
arguments in his casebook if he noted them all. Occasionally, the
casebook reports refer to the arguments "among my papers." A
number of reports originally written on the dockets never made it
into the casebook, including at least ten heard at the October 1788
term of the General Court. 5
For the years covering his service on the Court of Appeals,
Tucker's casebook reports consist mainly of his opinions, most of
which were later published in the reports of Daniel Call, William W.
Hening, and Robert Munford. For each of his terms on that court
there is also a set of loose papers, now carefully preserved in
thirteen folders. Again, the terse catalog entries barely hint at the
documentary richness of the collection. Just as he had done when
sitting on the General Court, Tucker used his dockets to take notes
of arguments in the Court of Appeals. He also used them to draft
opinions, including some that were never recorded in his casebook
or in the published reports. Indeed, preliminary investigation of
Tucker's loose papers indicates that they contain interesting matter
relating to Court of Appeals cases that has never been published.
Tucker did not, as was once thought, 6 cease note taking after
resigning from the Court of Appeals in 1811. As a federal judge
from 1813 to 1824, he compiled three additional notebooks of cases
heard in the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Circuit Court. Unlike
his Virginia Court of Appeals reports, Tucker's federal court reports
have remained largely unexamined. Supplementing these reports,
too, is a collection of loose papers-notes of arguments, memoranda,
pleadings, petitions, and correspondence-that pertain to the cases.
Preceding the reports is a memorandum book in which Tucker
entered digests of the various laws concerning the federal district
courts and alphabetically organized information on various topics
connected with admiralty and prize law. In sum, Tucker's papers
provide ample documentation of the workings of the lower federal
35. General Court docket (1788), in Box 66, Tucker-Coleman Papers (located at the Earl
Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary).
36. See, e.g., Charles T. Cullen, St. George Tucker, in THE VIRGINIA LAW REPORTERS
BEFORE 1880, at 96, 104 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed., 1977) (claiming that Tucker ceased note
taking as a federal judge).
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courts during his decade on the bench,37 a period in which those
courts heard a number of important cases, many growing out of the
War of 1812.
The balance of this Essay will deal with the first phase of
Tucker's state judicial career-the years he sat on the General
Court and rode circuit attending the district courts. Tucker's
reports of cases in these courts are mostly unpublished. They open
a rare window on what was happening at the trial and intermediate
appellate levels, imparting a sense and flavor to the courts as they
operated in the various districts, both near and remote from the
capital at Richmond. Greatly enhancing their historical value is the
illumination they cast on Virginia's post-Revolutionary efforts to
establish a workable system of state superior courts operating
alongside the older county court system dating from the colonial
period.
II. COURT REFORM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA
Tucker's case reports begin at the time Virginia's first state court
establishment, instituted during the Revolution, was undergoing
reform. Until 1776, judicial administration in Virginia consisted of
inferior county courts and one superior court, the General Court, all
of which had legislative and executive functions as well. As courts
of law, they decided a variety of causes--common law, equity,
exchequer, and spiritual-that in England would have been heard
in distinct courts for those purposes. The "gentlemen" justices who
composed these courts-the great landowners and prominent men
of affairs-were ill equipped to perform their diverse judicial duties,
few of them possessing more than a veneer of legal learning.38 Even
as late as the mid-nineteenth century, according to one commenta-
tor, there was "not one in fifty" county court judges who "pretended
to any knowledge of the law. '39 As for the colonial General Court, no
37. For the federal court reports and papers, see Box 72, Tucker-Coleman Papers, located
at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary. The editors of The
Papers of John Marshall used this material in documenting Marshall's circuit court cases.
See 7 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 33, at 396-97, 409-11.
38. See B. TUCKER, THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING 55 (Boston, Little & Brown 1846). The
author was St. George Tucker's son, Beverley Tucker.
39. Id. at 54.
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"legal attainments were required" for appointment to this body,
which was first and foremost an executive council.4' Not surpris-
ingly, legal proceedings were often irregular, with little attention
paid to niceties of procedure, forms of action, pleading, or any
technicalities that did not seem to go to the merits of a cause.4'
Particularly neglected in Virginia was the science of pleading, the
process of refining various claims and defenses into specific "issues"
for decision by court or jury.42 Technical learning of this sort
never took root because it was not essential to success at the bar.43
An advocate had to state his case with clear and simple reasoning
that could be comprehended by lay judges who "distrust[ed] every
argument which could not be understood without an effort. 44
Subtle points and fine distinctions were of little avail, and the
prudent lawyer avoided them so as "not to discredit his case. 45
The Virginia Constitution of 1776 laid the foundation of the first
state court system by providing for the appointment of judges of
appeals, common law, chancery, and admiralty. 46 The General
Assembly fleshed out the details in a series of enactments estab-
lishing the Court of Admiralty, the High Court of Chancery, the
General Court, and the Court of Appeals. 4' These superior courts
were engrafted upon the existing system of inferior county and
corporation courts; essentially, the new courts (excepting the
admiralty court) replaced the colonial General Court, which had
exercised both original and appellate jurisdiction and heard both
common law and equity causes.4" The impetus for court reform
began prior to the Revolution, and continued for more than a
decade after Independence. 49 Reformers desired a more efficient
and professional system of justice appropriate to a republican
40. See id. at 55.
41. See id. at 54-55.
42. See id. at 54.
43. See id. at 54-55.
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id. at 54-55.
46. 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 33, at xxviii. A more detailed and general discussion
of Virginia's post-Revolutionary court system is provided id. at xxviii-xxxiii.
47. Id. at xxviii.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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commonwealth.5" A staple of post-Revolutionary Virginia politics,
court reform encountered difficulties because of resistance from
interested parties and because improving the judicial organization
conflicted with the ideal of republican frugality in public expendi-
ture.
The new General Court succeeded to the common law jurisdiction
of its colonial counterpart, having original jurisdiction where the
debt or claim exceeded ten pounds, and appellate jurisdiction over
the county and corporation courts.51 It was also a court of oyer and
terminer for the trials of crimes and misdemeanors committed by
free persons.52 As originally constituted, the General Court was
composed of five judges, who were elected by joint ballot of both
houses of the legislature and held office during good behavior.53
Until 1789, the General Court was by far the busiest of the
commonwealth's superior courts. 4 Tucker's practice during the two
years he attended the superior courts was mostly confined to this
court.55 He also made regular appearances in the Court of Admi-
ralty, which had three judges and continued to sit in Williamsburg
after the capital moved to Richmond in 1780.5" Although his
reputation as a lawyer was rising, Tucker was not in practice long
enough to acquire many clients in the High Court of Chancery or
the Court of Appeals.57
The Virginia legislature inadvertently created a situation that led
to the collapse of the commonwealth's first judicial establishment
by staffing the Court of Appeals with all of the superior court
judges, not as a separate court.5" Members of the Court of Appeals
held their commissions as judges of their respective courts rather
than as judges of the Court of Appeals.5" This anomaly served as a
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAW, supra note 1, at 68.
55. Id. at 55-70.
56. Id. at 56; 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 33, at xxix.
57. CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAW, supra note 1, at 72-75, 77-99.
58. The Court of Appeals was composed of the superior court judges in order of rank: the
three chancellors, the five general court judges, and the three admiralty judges. 5 MARSHALL
PAPERS, supra note 33, at xxx.
59. Id.
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pretext for them to later claim that they "contracted no new
obligations by becoming judges of the court of appeals," that their
services on that tribunal were "voluntary," performed "with a view
to relieve the state from the necessity of sustaining additional
burthens in times of difficulty."' The crisis boiled over early in 1788
with the passage of the District Court Act.61 Pressure had been
building since before the Revolution to improve the administration
of justice at the local level. 2 For many years, the county courts were
inadequate, driving parties to the General Court in increasing
numbers, if they could afford the trip to the capital.63 Tucker noted
in 1787 that "it was computed that the suits then depending therein
could not be tried in less than five years, and they still continued to
accumulate."64
One proposed remedy was assize, or circuit courts, to try issues
of fact made up in the General Court, to which the verdict would be
returned and judgment entered. 5 Proposed legislation was enacted
on the third attempt in 1784, but it never took effect because of
resistance from those who believed the plan was too complicated
and inconvenient. 6 Naturally, strong resistance came from the
county court judges and lawyers. John Marshall, then in the
legislature, commented:
Those Magistrates who are tenacious of authority will not assent
to any thing which may diminish their ideal dignity & put into
the hands of others a power which they will not exercise
themselves. Such of the County Court lawyers too as are
suspicious that they do not possess abilities or knowledge
sufficient to enable them to stand before judges of law are
60. Id. (quoting Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 138
n.*, 139-40 (1788)).
61. Id. at xxx-xxxi.
62. Id. at xxxi.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting St. George Tucker, Summary View of the Judicial Courts of the
Commonwealth, and of the United States, in Virginia, in 3 TUCKER, BLAcKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 16, ed. app. at 11 [hereinafter Tucker, View of the Judicial
Courts]).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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opposd from motives of interest to any plan which may put the
distribution of justice into the hands of judges. 67
The Court of Appeals judges were also opposed to the assize plan
because they did not wish to ride circuit; because the Act was
suspended and ultimately repealed, the judges said nothing
"officially 
... respecting it.""
The District Court Act of January 1788 appeared to offer a more
eligible plan because it gave the district courts the power to decide
both law and fact.69 They would have the full power of the General
Court in their respective districts.'° The commonwealth was divided
into districts, to be attended by all the present superior court judges
and by four additional General Court judges appointed under the
Act.7 ' Tucker was elected to one of the new judgeships created at
this time. 72 By requiring all the superior court judges-who
together constituted the Court of Appeals-to attend the district
courts, the General Assembly reflected its unwillingness to incur
the expense of additional judges. 7' The legislature's frugality,
however, now drew forth an official protest from the judges of the
Court of Appeals. 4 In explaining their refusal to implement the Act,
they complained that it assigned new duties, beyond their commis-
sions, without a commensurate increase in pay, which undermined
the Virginia constitution's principle of an independent judiciary. 5
The upshot of this protest from the bench was the repeal of the
District Court Act and a complete overhaul of the commonwealth's
judicial structure, accomplished by three laws enacted in December
1788: a revised District Court Act establishing eighteen district
courts to be attended by ten General Court judges; an act creating
a separate Court of Appeals with five judges; and an act reducing
67. Id. (quoting Letter from John Marshall to Charles Simms (June 16, 1784), in 1
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 33, at 124).
68. Id. (quoting Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 139
(1788)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAW, supra note 1, at 63.
73. 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 33, at xxxi.
74. Id. at xxm-xxxii.
75. Id. at xxxii.
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the High Court of Chancery to one judge.7" This reorganization
necessitated just one additional judge to those appointed under the
preceding District Court Act; it was made possible by the transfer
to the General Court of three judges from the Court of Admiralty,
which soon ceased business because its jurisdiction was assumed
by newly established federal courts.7 These reforms established
the fundamental structure of Virginia's court system, which with
successive modifications endured to the Civil War. 78 The most
important change was decentralizing the common law jurisdiction
of the General Court into eighteen districts.79 As a concession to the
sensibilities of the county court establishment, the jurisdictional
amount for an original suit in the district courts was also raised to
thirty pounds (one hundred dollars).so The district court judges were
commissioned as judges of the General Court, and a court of that
name continued to sit twice a year, mostly as a fiscal court, a court
to hear suits and motions against public debtors and collectors, and
to receive probate of wills."1 Cases in the district courts that raised
new or difficult questions of law could also be adjourned to the
General Court for decision. 2 Writing in 1803, Tucker pronounced
himself generally satisfied with Virginia's court system, which stood
"upon as respectable a footing ... as in any state in the Union, and
perhaps in any other country."' Clogged dockets continued to be a
problem, but these actually reflected the virtues of the system: "[i]n
Virginia the cheapness of the law is perhaps one great cause of the
multitude of suits, and the delays which attend their decision."'
76. Id. (citing 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 733, 764, 766
(William Waller Hening ed., reprint 1969) (1822) [hereinafter STATUTES AT LARGE]).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. WILLIAM BROCKENBROUGH, BRIEF SKETCH OF THE COURT OF THIS COMMONWEALTH
(1815), reprinted in VIRGINIA REPORTS ANNOTATED 101-03 (1902) (Judge Brockenbrough's
introduction to volume two of Virginia Reporter of General Court cases (2 Va. Cas.)).
82. Id. at 102.
83. 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 33, at xxxii (omission in original) (quoting Tucker,
View of the Judicial Courts, supra note 64, ed. app. at 5).
84. Id. (quoting Tucker, View of the Judicial Courts, supra note 64, ed. app. at 5).
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III. TUCKER'S CIRCUIT TRAVELS
As provided in the revised District Court Act of December 1788,
the commonwealth was divided into eighteen districts embracing all
the counties of Virginia, which then included present-day West
Virginia.85 The judges were to attend the districts twice yearly, with
two judges to constitute a district court.' The districts were
organized into five circuits, four containing four districts and one
containing the other two, which were assigned to the judges by
yearly allotment. 87 Tucker traveled each of the five circuits at least
once during his tenure."
To plot the course of these circuits on a map is to gain a sense of
the dedication and sacrifice of Tucker and his fellow itinerants in
bringing justice to the citizens of the far-flung commonwealth. From
his home in Williamsburg in the southeastern corner of the
commonwealth, Tucker followed one circuit that began at Staunton
in the Valley of Virginia, proceeded eastward more or less in a
straight line across the Blue Ridge to Charlottesville, and then on
to Fredericksburg before veering northward to Dumfries. Tucker
traveled this circuit eight times. He also made eight trips on the
circuit that commenced at Winchester in the lower (northern)
Shenandoah Valley, proceeded westward over the first ridge of the
Alleghenies to Moorefield in Hardy County (West Virginia), and
ended in Morgantown in the far northwest county of Monongalia
on the Pennsylvania border. The circuit that included Tucker's
home district embraced most of the Tidewater counties north of
the James River, starting in the Northern Neck county of
Northumberland. From there it proceeded southward to King and
Queen on the middle peninsula and to Williamsburg, then turned
east across the Chesapeake Bay to Accomac on the Eastern
Shore. Tucker was assigned this relatively choice circuit for nine
terms. Another convenient circuit went from Richmond south to
Petersburg and Brunswick and then east to Suffolk, covering the
counties in the Richmond vicinity and south of the James River to
the North Carolina border. This circuit was allotted to Tucker only
85. CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAW, supra note 1, at 72, 197-98.
86. See id. at 72, 80.
87. Id. at 197-98. Subsequently, the number of districts increased to nineteen. Id. at 82.
88. See id. at 195.
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three times, however. The most extensive circuit began at Prince
Edward Courthouse in the southside Piedmont and went as far
southwest as Abingdon in Washington County, near the North
Carolina (later Tennessee) border more than three hundred miles
from Richmond. Tucker luckily did not have to travel the full route
on either of his two assignments to this circuit, going only as far as
Sweet Springs in Monroe County (West Virginia).
As a circuit-riding state judge, Tucker enjoyed remarkably good
health given the hardship of constant travel. On seven occasions,
sickness caused him to miss a district court or two, but never an
entire circuit. Over the course of fourteen years, Tucker sat with
eleven different judges. Spencer Roane was his most frequent
companion before Roane was promoted to the Court of Appeals in
1794. Paul Carrington, Jr., who succeeded Roane on the General
Court, also traveled frequently with Tucker beginning in the mid-
1790s. Other judges who attended at least three circuits with
Tucker were Joseph Jones, Joseph Prentis, and Robert White.89
Tucker's association with White, who was from Winchester, began
during his first Winchester circuit in 1790, when White was still at
the bar. After he joined the General Court in 1793, White sat with
Tucker on two Winchester circuits and one Staunton circuit. In
1802, Tucker sent his son Henry St. George to study law in
Winchester, an indication of his great respect for White.9 °
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF TUCKER'S REPORTS IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
AND GENERAL COURT
From the time he began riding circuit in the spring of 1789 until
his last circuit in the fall of 1803, Tucker reported more than four
hundred cases. Preliminary investigation has turned up some two
dozen instances in which he recorded his disagreement with his
brother judge or judges. Tucker's superior legal knowledge and his
tendency to adhere to the technical rules of law may account in part
for his occasional clashes on the bench. According to Call, Tucker
"was considered as decidedly the most learned judge" of the General
89. Tucker also served with James Henry, William Nelson, Richard Parker, Henry
Tazewell, John Tyler, and Edmond Winston.
90. See Tucker, supra note 1, at 797. Henry St. George Tucker settled permanently in
Winchester.
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Court after Henry Tazewell left to join the Court of Appeals in
1793."' Call went on to observe that Tucker's opinions were
"generally learned and sound; but sometimes a little tinctured with
technicality, arising I believe from his having been entered in a
special pleader's office in Bermuda, in order to learn that intricate
science; which gave a bias to his mind, that he never, entirely, got
rid of."92
Tucker's preference for standing by the strict requirements of law
is well illustrated by a murder case in 1793. Although Judge Roane
believed an indictment was sufficient,9 3 Tucker objected to it as
faulty for not sufficiently alleging the length and depth of the
wounds to show that they were mortal and for not alleging which
hand held the knife.94 In like manner, at a General Court session in
the same year, a question arose whether the grand jury present-
ments of the preceding session on which indictments were to be
prepared should be sent to the presently sitting grand jury.95 A
precedent was cited showing that the General Court in 1782 had
tried and convicted a criminal upon an indictment prepared upon
a grand jury presentment but not submitted to the grand jury.96
Three of the four sitting judges thought this precedent was
sufficient to justify filing an indictment without referring it to the
grand jury.97 Tucker alone dissented, contending "that without such
submission it was no Indictment[,] an indictment being totidem
verbis the words of the grand jury-and no proceeding not having
their sanction can be called an Indictment.""
Tucker's penchant for observing legal niceties extended to civil
cases, as well. On a motion against a sheriff for not returning an
execution, it was objected that the notice given to the sheriff did not
91. Call, supra note 6, at xxviii; CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAW, supra note 1, at 193.
92. Call, supra note 6, at xxviii.
93. Commonwealth v. Yowles (May 9, 1793), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk.
2, at 78.
Tucker wrote his case summaries in notebooks, which he later bound into three volumes.
See supra text following note 18. This Essay will follow the citation convention above. The
court's name is ignored because the weight of authority is not essential for this discussion.
94. Id.
95. Unnamed Case (June 10, 1793), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 2, at 82.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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recite the execution accurately.99 Judge Carrington was disposed to
give judgment for the plaintiff, believing the variance immaterial.
Tucker thought it was fatal."° Similarly, on a motion for judgment
on a forthcoming bond in a different case, the sheriffs recital of the
sum due exceeded by about £ 130 the sum stated in the execution.1
Tucker said the 'law requires that in reciting the [Execution] the
sum due thereon, should be truly recited.""0 2 If the difference was
material and the error against the defendant, "he may well avail
himself of it."'0 3 Judge Prentis disagreed, "thinking it sufficient that
the party's names were truly recited & judging unnecessary &
improper for the Court to enter into any calculations in order to
ascertain the sum due on the [Execution]."1"4 He mentioned a Court
of Appeals case in support, but Tucker cited another Court of
Appeals precedent, which he said "accords with my opinion in this
Case."" 5
Fully half of Tucker's recorded judicial disagreements were with
Judge John Tyler, all but one of which occurred on a single circuit
in the spring of 1798. Tyler was not enamored with legal learn-
ing-he "disliked law books, and particularly those of England"
06
-a circumstance that no doubt increased the likelihood of conflict
with the scholarly Tucker. On the first day of the Fredericksburg
term in May 1798, Tucker reported three cases, and in all three
Tyler opposed him.1 7 Having already encountered Tyler's contrari-
ety at the Staunton court, Tucker sounded a note of exasperation by
the time he recorded his third Fredericksburg case. An action to
recover a debt had twice been continued at the instance of the
99. Alexander v. Jones (Sept. 18, 1797), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 6,
at 38.
100. Id.
101. Pierce v. Burwell (Oct. 3, 1798), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 7, at 29.
In giving a forthcoming bond, a judgment debtor against whom execution had levied could
keep his property until the day of sale. 1 THE REVISED CODEOFTHE LAWSOFVIRGINIA: BEING
A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 530 (Richmond, Ritchie 1819).
102. Pierce v. Burwell (Oct. 3, 1798), supra note 101, nbk.7, at 29.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Call, supra note 6, at xxiii.
107. Coleman v. Day (May 1, 1798); Windor v. Thornton (May 1, 1798); Haywood's Adm'rs
v. Brooke's Adm'rs (May 1, 1798), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 7, at 4-5.
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defendants.' Of the three plaintiffs, executors of the creditor, two
were Virginians and had died; the third resided out of state.0 9 At
the time the jury came to be sworn, defendants' counsel moved for
security for costs." 0 Tucker's entry reads:
Tyler Judge seemed to think it reasonable that the [plain-
tiff] should give Security-Tucker totis veribus [with all
his might] contra. The [defendant] at the moment that the
Cause is ready for trial endeavours to shun the trial of the
issue and to avail himself by a [hitch?] of... the [plaintiff's]
situation-he ought to have given notice sixty days. I will
not aid him to do Injustice by granting a Continuance,
merely to give him an unjust advantage. If he goes to trial,
& a Verdict be for him, he will not be put to one penny's
additional Costs. If we grant his motion[,] he defeat the
[plaintiff] of a Just demand."'
In the following days, Tucker recorded five more instances of
opposition from Tyler at Fredericksburg, followed by another early
in the Dumfries term."2 On the third day of that court, Tucker
noted, perhaps with relief, that "Mr. Tyler left the Court."" 3
While affording a glimpse of the interactions among the judges,
Tucker also brought the lawyers within his notice, usually in
connection with various motions made during the course of the
trial. Typically, such motions asked the court to admit or exclude
evidence or to instruct or not instruct the jury in one way, or
another. It was common practice for the lawyer who lost a motion
to file a bill of exceptions to the court's ruling. In this way the
court's action became part of the official record and thus subject to
appeal. A lawyer might file a bill of exceptions just to get the matter
on record, whether or not he seriously intended to appeal the case.
A notorious user, or abuser, of this device was John "Jock" Warden,
108. Haywood's Adm'rs v. Brooke's Adm'rs (May 1, 1798), supra note 107, nbk.7, at 5.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. David Greenlaw's Case (May 2, 1798); Woodford's Ex'rs v. Banks (May 5, 1798);
Clayton v. Latham (May 5, 1798); Mercer v. Hedgman (May 14, 1798); Ex parte Thilman
(May 16, 1798); Waggoner v. Stuart (May 19, 1798), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18,
nbk. 7, at 5-16.
113. Notation on May 20, 1798, in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 7, at 16.
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a canny veteran of the Virginia bar whose legal acumen more
than compensated for his homely appearance. 114 Tucker regis-
tered his irritation at King and Queen in September 1797, when on
successive days Warden filed bills of exceptions after being
overruled."' Tucker's entry in the second of these cases reads: 'The
Court overruled the Objection and Warden, as usual, tendered an
Exception.""' In another case at that term, Warden demurred to a
plea and was overruled. 1 7 In the margin Tucker noted: 'Memo:
Warden for the first time agreed that this Opinion though against
him was right!!!"1' 8
Tucker rarely went through a term without entering at least
one case, if only a few lines. On a few occasions he was obliged to
record "no case of importance" or "no point of law worth noting
occurred.""' 9 The great majority of the reports were of original cases
brought in the district courts, and most of these were civil cases,
which were more likely than criminal cases to raise issues of law.
A smaller group of reported cases consisted of appeals from the
county courts. Tucker also reported cases heard at the June and
November sittings of the General Court, the most important of
which were those that had been adjourned from the districts for
novelty and difficulty.
Although reformers were unable to do much to improve the
county courts, the establishment of the district courts cut signifi-
cantly into the business of the former, attracting numerous clients
who formerly had to resort to the local court. Still, the jurisdictional
minimum of one hundred dollars in the district courts ensured that
the counties would continue to hear the multitude of suits involving
small claims."'2 Justice continued to be administered in the county
114. SAMUEL MORDECAI, RICHMOND IN BY-GONE DAYS 81-82 (Richmond, West 1856).
115. See McCall & Shedden v. Moore's Adm'rs (Sept. 22, 1797); McDoual v. Fleet (Sept.
23, 1797), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 6, at 41-42.
116. McDoual v. Fleet (Sept. 23, 1797), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 115, nbk. 6,
at 42.
117. Dunlop v. Dunn (Sept. 23, 1797), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 6, at
43.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Charlottesville Dist. Ct. (Apr. 1798), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18,
nbk. 7, at 4; Petersburg Dist. Ct. (Apr. 1802); Brunswick Dist. Ct. (Apr. 1802); Suffolk Dist.
Ct. (Apr. 1802); Charlottesville Dist. Ct. (Apr. 1803), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18,
nbk. 9, at 6, 30.
120. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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courts by amateur magistrates, and the lawyers presenting cases
before them were often inexperienced neophytes or practitioners of
the second rank who could not compete at the superior court bar.121
Appeals from these courts were thus a regular occurrence, though
evidently much less frequent than under the former establishment.
County court appeals ordinarily proceeded by a writ of supersedeas
commanding the sheriff to stop execution of the judgment below and
to give notice of a rehearing in the superior court.'22 In Virginia,
supersedeas was in most cases a substitute for the writ of error and
could be issued to reverse county court judgments where the
amount in dispute was at least thirty-three dollars.'23 Tucker
usually indicated at the beginning of his report that the case was an
appeal and named the county whence it came. A cursory review
indicates that he reversed most of the county court judgments he
considered, with faulty pleading being a prominent ground for
reversal.
In one such case, Tucker noted that the declaration was defective,
that the defendant failed to demur and instead gave an informal
plea, and that the plaintiffs replication was "as bad as the plea."'24
He went on to observe that the court had given judgment for the
defendant, which it "certainly ... could not." 2' Yet they could not
adjudge "for the [plaintiff] upon this Decl[aration]."126 He ultimately
decided that because the court gave a judgment "substantially right
in law," he could "not say it ought to be reversed." '27 In other cases,
the county court permitted defective pleadings in indebitatus
assumpsit, a common action for the recovery of debts arising from
everyday transactions such as goods sold and delivered, work done,
money lent, and money due by account. Before reversing one such
case, Tucker commented: 'This record is so full of Error throughout
that it would be tedious to analyze it. The [plaintiff] has clearly
121. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
122. 1 CONwAY ROBINSON, THE PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY IN VIRGINIA
660 (Richmond, Shepard 1832).
123. 1 REVISED CODE OFTHE LAWS OFVIRGINIA, supra note 101, at 239; 1 ROBINSON, supra
note 122, at 660.
124. Finch's Ex'r v. Tyler, Ex'r of Munford (Oct. 9, 1794), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra
note 18, nbk. 4, at 18.
125. Id. at 19.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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misconceived his Action, for the Services performed as an overseer
for which he ought to have brought Covenant."' 8 He went on to
recite other errors in the declaration and also in the defendant's
plea, while pointing out that the jury had found "a Verdict upon the
third Count, on which there is neither plea nor issue."'29
The large number and variety of original cases Tucker deemed
worthy of reporting resist classification except in broad general
terms. The great majority of his civil cases involved the recovery of
a debt or a dispute over property. One debt case is particularly
useful in showing how Tucker shaped it in a way to settle a
pressing legal question of the day: whether a defendant in an action
brought by a British creditor for a debt incurred before the War of
Independence was entitled to discount interest during the war
years. Although the plea of "British debt" no longer sufficed to deny
or delay suits for such debts in Virginia courts, juries routinely
subtracted eight years' interest in rendering their verdicts-over
the loud protests of British plaintiffs. 3 ° In federal court, juries
deducted interest despite explicit instructions from the judge that
interest must be regarded as part of the debt.' 3 ' Because this
disallowance was done as part of a general verdict, the question
could not be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 3 ' All that a judge
could do was order a new trial-which would produce the same
result.
133
At King and Queen District Court in April 1795, the defendant's
lawyer moved to enter a plea of "British debt."' 4 Tucker said the
plea could "neither operate in Bar, nor in Abatement," but as to the
question of war interest intended to be raised by the plea, "he
thought it high time the point should be settled."13 He then added:
128. Basset v. Binns (Apr. 1800), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 8, at 14.
129. Id.
130. See Charles F. Hobson, The Recovery of British Debts in the Federal Circuit Court of
Virginia, 1790 to 1797, VA. MAG. HIsT. & BIOGRAPHY 176, 193-95 (1984).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 195.
133. 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 33, at 371 (citing sources).
134. See McCall v. Turner (Apr. 20, 1795), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk.
4, at 45.
135. Id.
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The difficulty was in what shape to bring it on.-If [plaintiff]
were really absent during the War, & no Agent or Attorney
within the State, this for ought he knew might be proper
Evidence for the Consideration of a Jury; but he knew of no
method of bringing on the Question by pleading. 136
In order to get a decision so that justice would "no longer [be]
delayed by Doubts on the subject," Tucker recommended that the
defendant give the plaintiff written notice of his intention to move
the court to offer evidence to the jury to prove the plaintiff was
absent during the war and had no agent to whom the debt could be
paid.13 7 At the ensuing trial, upon the motion to introduce evidence,
Tucker said,"Without giving any Opinion whether the Evidence be
proper or not, I agree that it may be offered to the Jury, in order
that this long contested point may be settled."'38 The plaintiff's
lawyer, none other than John Warden, tendered a bill of exceptions,
making this ruling part of the record for a possible appeal. 39 When
the jury deducted eight years' interest, Warden appealed. 40 The
Virginia Court of Appeals upheld Tucker's ruling and the jury's
verdict in 1797.1'Land title disputes figure prominently in Tucker's reports, as
signified by the many entries of "ejectment" cases. The action of
ejectment was an elaborate fiction, designed for the purpose of
asserting title to real property. In form, ejectment was a personal
action in trespass brought by an ousted leaseholder for the recovery
of his lease and the damages suffered by the loss.142 Its true
function was to enable a freeholder to recover real property by
trying the merits of his title against those of another claimant. Over
time, ejectment had become the common means of trying title to
real estate, virtually supplanting the ancient and often cumbersome
real actions. 43 One of Tucker's cases raised the question of
"whether one parcener can maintain an Ejectment against another
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. M'Call v. Turner, 5 Va. (1 Call) 133, 139-47 (1797).
142. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 301-03 (4th ed. 2002).
143. Id.
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for an undivided part of the Inheritance."'144 Neither the lawyers nor
Tucker had ever found such a case, 145 prompting the judge to enter
into an extended disquisition on the nature of ejectment. Citing
Blackstone, he admitted that the law was express that coparceners
could not maintain an action of trespass against each other. 46 He
conceded as well that ejectment was "in point of form, an action of
Trespass.'147 But the authorities were equally clear that ejectment
was a fiction devised to obtain justice by compelling the parties to
go to trial on the merits unencumbered by elaborate pleadings.14
Ejectment had become the nearly universal method of trying title
to lands, founded on the same principle "as the Ancient Writs of
Assize, and hath succeeded to those real actions, as more conve-
nient for attaining the Ends of Justice. 149 If ejectment was in
substance the equivalent of the ancient real actions, then one only
had to consult Coke on Littleton "to discover that although parcen-
ers cannot maintain an action of Trespass, ... they may have a writ
of assize against each other."'5 ° He accordingly ruled that ejectment
was the proper action in this case. 151
Tucker's most noteworthy land case was an ejectment brought by
David Hunter, claiming under a patent from the commonwealth,
against Denny Martin Fairfax, who, as heir to Lord Fairfax,
asserted the validity of his title to the Northern Neck of Virginia. 152
Tucker upheld the Fairfax title in a long and elaborate opinion
given at Winchester in April 1794.158 Hunter appealed this case to
the Court of Appeals, where it languished a number of years before
being argued in April 1809. Tucker was then sitting on that court
but disqualified himself because "my Son Henry has now become a
party interested in it"-an allusion to Henry St. George Tucker's
144. Dunkenson & Wife v. Moore (Sept. 4, 1802), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18,
nbk. 9, at 8.
145. See id. at 8-9.
146. See id. at 9.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id. (citing Blackstone).
150. Id. at 11.
151. Id. at 12.
152. See Hunter v. Fairfax (Apr. 22, 1794), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk.
3, at 39-50.
153. Id.
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1806 marriage to David Hunter's daughter.'54 The next year the
Court of Appeals reversed Tucker's Winchester judgment. 5 ' The
case then went by writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
in 1813 reversed the state appellate court.5 6 After the Virginia
Court of Appeals refused to accept the Supreme Court's mandate,
the Supreme Court again heard the case, this time in 1816, as
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, and again ruled in favor of the Fairfax
title in the course of affirming in strong nationalist terms the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over the state courts. 157 By
this time, the constitutional issue greatly overshadowed the original
land dispute.5 8 Ironically, if Tucker had not been forced to recuse
himself in 1809, the state court might well have affirmed the 1794
judgment, making unnecessary an appeal to the Supreme Court.
The counterpart to ejectment for land was "detinue for a slave.' 59
Detinue was the common law remedy for recovery of a specific
personal property and damages for the property's detention. 60 It
had fallen into disuse in England, having been superseded by
"trover and conversion. 161 In trover, however, the plaintiff recov-
ered the value of the property, not the thing itself.'62 To recover the
specific thing, only detinue would lie, and it was therefore a
common action for regaining possession of slaves.'6 3 At King and
Queen in September 1792, however, the plaintiff in Tucker's court,
instead of bringing detinue, sued out a writ of "formedon in the
descender," one of the ancient real actions, to recover "eleven slaves,
annexed to certain Lands in tail."'1 4 The defendant's lawyer, who
perhaps had never encountered such a writ, pleaded "non detinet,"
the general issue in detinue6 5 The plaintiff demurred, placing the
154. See id. at 50.
155. Id.
156. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 628 (1813).
157. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 362 (1816).
158. Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall and the Fairfax Litigation: The Background of
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 2 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 36, 46-48 (1996).
159. Tucker commonly used this phrase in his case notes.
160. 4 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 16, at 151-53.
161. Id. at 152.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 152 ed. n.5.
164. Spottswood v. Claiborne's Ex'rs (Sept. 25, 1792), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note
18, nbk. 2, at 65.
165. See id.
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question in the hands of the court.' Tucker clearly relished the
opportunity to conduct a thorough investigation of the subject as
set forth in the works of Blackstone and Coke explicating the
statute of 1285, de Donis, which gave the action. 'This action being
a perfect novelty in our Courts," he said, "we must consider the
nature, origin, & application of it."167 Much of his ensuing analysis
was directed at refuting the plaintiffs contention "that wherever
anything may be entailed[,] a writ of formedon will lie."16 After
showing that this proposition was not "well founded," Tucker next
met the argument based on the "strong analogy between Villeins
regardant and intailed, or annexed Slaves, in this Country."'69 He
concluded that the writ of formedon would lie to recover a villein
only if "brought for the Manor to which he was regardant."170 It was
not the proper writ to recover a villein alone, who had been taken
away from his manorial lord.' 7' Tucker painstakingly viewed the
case in every possible light, "endeavouring to satisfy every Mind of
the principles upon which my Determination is founded."172 He
found for the defendant, holding that if the defendant's plea did not
adequately answer the declaration, the fault lay with the plaintiff
in misconceiving his action. 71 Some of Tucker's disquisition
prompted by this case reappeared in an appendix to his edition of
Blackstone.
174
In addition to actions to recover slave property, Tucker also
reported cases in which slaves themselves asserted a claim-to
recover their status as free persons. Such suits for freedom were
common in Virginia, most often by persons claiming descent from
a free Indian woman. In form, these suits were personal torts,
usually trespass for assault and battery and false imprisonment,
but were universally understood to be fictitious actions analogous
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 65-67.
169. Id. at 67-68.
170. Id. at 68.
171. Id. at 69.
172. Id. at 72.
173. Id. at 73.
174. St. George Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, in 2 TucKER, BLAcKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 16, ed. app. at 43 n.t [hereinafter Tucker, State of Slavery].
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to ejectment.'75 Several of Tucker's reports of freedom suits raised
an interesting question of evidence concerning the authenticity of
a manuscript copy of colonial law enacted in the late seventeenth
century. Until the revisal of 1733, Virginia laws existed mostly in
manuscript, except for a couple of printed editions, 171 including that
compiled by John Purvis and published in 1684.77 In the case of
"George, a Negroe," tried at Accomac District Court in May 1795,
Tucker reported that the plaintiff's lawyer "produced a Copy of
Purvis, at the End of which was a Manuscript Copy of the Act of
1691, c. 9, the title of which appears in the Ed[ition] of 1733, pa:
94.-authorizing a free trade with Indians, and requested the
Courts instruction to the Jury thereupon."178 The significance of the
1691 Act was that it indicated the General Assembly's intention to
disclaim its right to make slaves of Indians, as had been done by a
law of 1682.179
[Tucker] left it to the Jury to decide whether this was a Copy of
the Act in question, the Copy being evidently very ancient, the
title corresponding, and the records of those days wholly
destroyed by the British Army in 1781, but would not instruct
them either to regard the same as Law, or to disregard it.'"
The jury could not agree in George's case,18' but two years later,
in a case brought on behalf of a woman named Airy, Tucker
instructed the jury that the manuscript copy of the Act in Purvis
was authentic and further that "the burthen of proof upon this issue
lay upon the Defendant."'82 Again, the jury could not agree, and no
verdict was rendered.8 3 Finally, in May 1800, Tucker instructed the
175. See, e.g., Coleman v. Dick & Pat, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 233, 239 (1793) (Pendleton, J.).
176. 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 76, at 9 n.*.
177. JOHN PURVIs, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OFALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA Now IN FORCE
(London, 1684).
178. George, a Negroe v. Walker (May 14, 1795), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18,
nbk. 5, at 7.
179. See An Act for a Free Trade with Indians (Apr. 1691), in 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 76, at 69; An Act to Repeal a Former Law Making Indians and Others Free (Nov. 1682),
in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 76, at 490-92.
180. George, a Negroe v. Walker (May 14, 1795), supra note 178, nbk. 5, at 7.
181. Id.
182. Airy v. Kelham (Oct. 17, 1797), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk.-6, at 44.
183. Id.
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jury that if they found that the plaintiffs ancestor was an Indian
brought into Virginia before November 10, 1682, or after April 16,
1691 (the dates of enactment of the two relevant laws), they should
find for the plaintiff.14 This time the plaintiff secured her
freedom.'85 The law in this respect remained unsettled for some
years afterward, the prevailing opinion being that Indian slavery
did not cease until 1705.186 The revisal of that year reenacted the
1691 law but without any indication of its date.187 In the 1808 case
of Pallas v. Hill, the Virginia Court of Appeals recognized the
authenticity of the manuscript of the 1691 Act as stating the law of
the land from that date. 188 Tucker, then a judge on the court,
commented that William W. Hening, the great compiler of Vir-
ginia's statutes, had obtained a copy of the 1691 law from the same
book Tucker had seen at Accomac in 1795.189
In this general survey of Tucker's reports, a brief notice of his
criminal cases is appropriate. In addition to murder, the crime most
frequently mentioned, Tucker reported cases of manslaughter,
burglary, forgery, assault, horse stealing, perjury, and illegal
gambling. Several of his cases called attention to an unresolved
question of criminal procedure: whether a prisoner in custody of the
district court must be sent to an examining court before he could be
tried in the superior court. While the grand jury at Monongalia was
sitting in 1796, a guard delivered a loaded pistol to a prisoner
accused of murder. 9 ° At the direction of the district court, the
commonwealth's attorney prepared an indictment against the
184. Annis, an Indian Woman v. Stringer (May 19, 1800), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra
note 18, nbk. 8, at 29.
185. Id. The next day, Tucker, noting the "facts and testimony in [the Annis] case being
precisely the same as [the Airy] case, ... delivered the same charge to the Jury." Airy, an
Indian Woman v. Kelham (May 20, 1800), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 8, at
29. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Id.
186. 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 76, at 69 n.*.
187. Id.
188. Pallas v. Hill, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 149, 150, 157-58 (1808).
189. Id. at 158. Tucker also mentioned the Accomac adjudications in his opinion in
Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 138 (1806). Accord Tucker, State of Slavery,
supra note 174, ed. app. at 47 n.§ (expressing the opinion that no Indians brought into
Virginia after 1691 could be retained in slavery in Virginia).
190. See John Oddewald's Case (Sept. 22, 1796), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18,
nbk. 6, at 6.
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guard, who was subsequently tried and acquitted. 9' Tucker noted
that he and Judge White agreed that an "examining court was not
of necessity, in all Cases, but only in such where the accusation
is first made before a Justice of the Peace, or founded upon a
Coroner's Inquest, in which Case the law is express."'92 The next
year Tucker and White tried another accused criminal who had not
been brought before an examining court. 9 ' Hearing that some of the
other judges "differed in opinion from them,"194 Tucker and White
then adjourned a case from Staunton to the General Court, which
in November 1800 by "a large majority" (Tyler alone dissenting)
agreed that a person indicted and arrested under the direction of
the district court could be tried there without the intervention of an
examining court."'
In two of his murder cases Tucker preserved a record of his
charge to the jury. One of these was an indictment "for the wilful,
deliberate & premeditated Murder of one Sarah Boston, by
throwing her on a Bed, beating her with his fists, kicking her, &
choking her with his hands, in consequence of which she died on the
fourth day after."'96 Murder was evidently a rare occurrence on
the Eastern Shore, for Tucker noted that this was the first such
case to come before the Accomac District Court.' He accordingly
conceived it to be his duty to enter upon a thorough exposition of
the law, carefully defining and distinguishing the various kinds
and degrees of homicide and explaining the meaning of such terms
as "malice aforethought" and "implied" malice.'98 The jury in this
case acquitted Boston's accused murderer. 99 Tucker repeated this
charge in another murder case six months later in Fredericksburg,
adding some observations about cases not explicitly mentioned in
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Jesse Martin's Case (May 16, 1797), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk.
6, at 25.
194. Thomas Blakely's Case (Nov. 15, 1800), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk.
8, at 25.
195. Id.
196. Willis McCottrack als. McCotter's Case (May 15, 1800), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes,
supra note 18, nbk. 8, at 16.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 18-19.
199. See id. at 20.
2006] 1273
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the statute but that might be within the legislature's intention "in
distinguishing the different Degrees of Murder."2" He left no record
of the jury's verdict on that occasion.2° '
This overview concludes with two cases that elicited noteworthy
opinions from Tucker affirming the judiciary's right to pronounce
a law void as contrary to the constitution. Sitting with Roane at
Dumfries in May 1793, Tucker left the bench, refusing to hear a
motion for an injunction to stay a judgment of the district court.1 2
A law of 1792 authorized the district courts to issue injunctions and
to hear cases on injunctions in the same way that such suits were
heard in the High Court of Chancery. °3 On this occasion, Tucker
briefly gave his reasons for not hearing the motion, notably that the
effect of the law would "be to annihilate the Constitutional Court
of Chancery" and that the Virginia Constitution required that
chancery judges must be "elected, & commissioned, as such."204 After
the motion was renewed following Tucker's departure, Roane
adjourned the case to the General Court "for novelty & difficulty. 2 °6
Tucker's action precipitated the celebrated case of Kamper v.
Hawkins, the leading precedent in Virginia for what became known
as "judicial review.''20 6 At the November 1793 session of the General
Court, the five sitting judges-Tucker, Tyler, Henry, Roane, and
Nelson-delivered opinions, all of them agreeing that the court was
duty bound to regard the constitution in pronouncing the law.20 7
Tucker, building on his amicus brief in the 1782 "Case of the
Prisoners," gave an elaborate defense of judicial review as it came
to be formulated in the early republic. He stressed the great
importance of a written constitution whose principles could "be
ascertained from the living letter, not from obscure reasoning or
200. John Carter's Case (Oct. 2, 1800), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk. 8, at
34.
201. Id.
202. Anonymous Case [Kamper v. Hawkins] (May 23, 1793), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes,
supra note 18, nbk. 2, at 81.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Robertson, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 518, 547-48 (1849); Goddin v. Crump,
35 Va. (8 Leigh) 120, 133 (1837).
207. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 20-108 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1793).
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deductions only."2 ° He described a constitution as "a rule to all the
departments of the government, to the judiciary as well as to the
legislature, 2 9 a phrase echoed by Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison.210 A point of more than passing interest is that
Marshall, as a lawyer, argued Kamper v. Hawkins. This fact has
escaped notice because neither Tucker's casebook report nor the
published report included arguments or even mentioned the names
of the participating lawyers. Tucker, however, jotted down a brief
summary of arguments-naming Marshall and John Warden-in one
of his General Court dockets.2"
Kamper v. Hawkins is a well-known case, having been subse-
quently published, no doubt with great assistance from Tucker's
manuscript report.212 Not generally known, however, is Tucker's
unpublished opinion in another adjourned case heard by the
General Court in November 1800. The original case was an action
of debt on a bond at the Prince Edward District Court.2 1 The
defendant objected at the trial to permitting the bond to be evidence
for the jury to consider because it was not written on stamped paper
pursuant to an act of Congress.2 14 Tucker framed the court's inquiry
in these words:
This Question is of the utmost importance; on the one hand we
are to enquire, whether there be any, & what Limits to the
powers of the federal Legislature; and on the other, whether
there be any, & what rights, reserved to the several States, by
the federal Constitution? Secondly, whether this Court is a
proper tribunal before which such enquiry can constitutionally
be made;-thirdly, and lastly, in Case of an affirmative Decision
on the'former points, whether the Act of Congress imposing a
208. Id. at 78.
209. Id. at 79.
210. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). For Tucker's role in the "Case of the Prisoners"
(Commonwealth v. Caton), see CULLEN, TUCKER AND LAW, supra note 1, at 36.
211. General Court docket (June 1793), in Box 66, Tucker-Coleman Papers (located at the
Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary).
212. The case was first published in 1794 as a pamphlet entitled REPORT OF A CASE
DECIDED ON SATURDAY, THE 16TH OF NOVEMBER, 1793, IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA;
WHEREIN PETER KAMPER, WAS PLAINTIFF, AGAINsT MARY HAWKINs, DEFENDANT
(Philadelphia, M'Kenzic 1794).
213. Woodson v. Randolph (Nov. 14, 1800), in 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk.
8, at 37.
214. Id.
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Duty on stamps, so far as it declares that no Bond which shall
be written on unstampt paper, shall be given in Evidence in any
Court, does exceed the Limits of federal legislative power, and
trench upon the rights reserved by the Constitution to the
several states.1 6
He went on to give a strict reading to the powers of Congress, an
expansive reading of the powers reserved to the states, a reaffirma-
tion of his Kamper opinion in support of the state court's right to
inquire into the limits of federal authority, and concluded with a
ruling that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in
requiring bonds to be on stamped paper.2 16 This time, however,
Tucker had only Judge Tyler (his erstwhile nemesis) with him.
Judges Prentis, Nelson, White, and Carrington were of the opinion
that the Act was within Congress's power to lay and collect taxes
and to make all laws necessary and proper for executing its
enumerated powers.217
CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey has been conducted to give some idea of the
nature and contents of St. George Tucker's legal manuscripts and
to suggest that they constitute a documentary treasure of
immense value. A meticulous record keeper and inveterate note
taker, Tucker created a personal legal archive that is virtually
unsurpassed as a source for documenting the "Americanization" of
the common law as it unfolded in the republican Commonwealth of
Virginia in the decades following the American Revolution. He was
both a working judge and a legal scholar, alert to new and interest-
215. Id.
216. Id. at 37-49.
217. Id. at 49. The brief published report of this case includes only the court's official
judgment. Woodson v. Randolph, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 128, 128-29 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1800). Tucker's
early draft of his opinion can be found in his General Court docket for November 1800. This
draft is endorsed "Loose Thoughts upon the Stamp-Act." St. George Tucker, General Court
docket (Nov. 1800), in Box 66, Tucker-Coleman Papers (located at the Earl Gregg Swem
Library at The College of William and Mary); see also Kurt T. Lash, 'Tucker's Rule" St.
George Tucker and the Limited Construction of Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1343,
1371 n.155 (2006) (noting the significance of this case as the "first extended discussion and
justification of the power ofjudicial review by any judge, state or federal, prior to Marbury").
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ing questions of law that presented themselves in the various courts
on which he sat, even in the most mundane cases.
Tucker's law papers should be published in an annotated
scholarly edition, with appropriate apparatus, such as tables of
cases and statutes, a glossary of legal terminology, a biographical
dictionary, and a general introductory essay on the law in post-
Revolutionary Virginia. At minimum, such an edition should
include the three manuscript volumes of reports in Virginia courts
from 1786 to 1811. Tucker obviously intended these reports to be
preserved as a single integrated document, and they should be
published as such. A project for this purpose was begun nearly
thirty years ago, but the editor embarked on a career path that
prevented him from pursuing it further.218 Such an enterprise ought
to be revived and expanded to include the additional notebooks of
reports of cases in the U.S. District Court and U.S. Circuit Court
from 1813 to 1824. Moreover, the loose papers should be thor-
oughly searched for materials relating to the reported cases, most
importantly notes of attorneys' arguments and drafts of opinions
that Tucker did not record in his casebook. While serving primarily
as a source for annotating the case reports, some of the loose
papers-for example, drafts of unreported opinions-might merit
publication in their own right.
Such an edition would make accessible an extensive collection of
hitherto unpublished reports in the state and federal courts of
Virginia. Even where his casebook duplicates much that is in the
published reports of Court of Appeals cases (because it was a
principal source for those reports), Tucker's reports and loose
term papers provide a valuable supplement to Call, Hening, and
Munford. A few examples from the May 1804 term serve to
illustrate the point. In a case in which the court reversed a High
Court of Chancery decree on a technicality, Call reported Judge
Lyon's one-sentence opinion directing the chancery court to make
proper parties.219 Tucker added some clarification in his casebook
report, explaining that "no opinion was delivered in court upon the
merits; the Judges appeared not to be agreed in their opinions
218. At the time he commenced work on the project, Dr. Cullen was in Williamsburg as
editor of the papers of John Marshall. In 1979, he moved to Princeton to be the editor of the
papers of Thomas Jefferson. He was president of the Newberry Library in Chicago from 1986
until his retirement in 2005.
219. Carter's Ex'r v. Currie, 9 Va. (5 Call) 158, 160 (1804).
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respecting them."22 ° He himself did prepare an unreported opinion
on the merits and preserved it with his papers.221 In another case,
Tucker was the only judge who prepared a written opinion, which
Call duly printed, omitting, however, Tucker's marginal memoran-
dum noting specific points of agreement and disagreement with his
fellow judges.222 In other cases, too, Call omitted Tucker's marginal
notes keyed to various passages in his opinions. Indeed, indications
are that some very interesting information in Tucker's margina-
lia-including the dates of arguments and opinions, citations of
cases not mentioned in the body of the opinion, and memoranda of
other judges' views--did not get into the published reports of Court
of Appeals cases.223
Professor James Oldham demonstrated how the manuscript
notes of eighteenth-century English judges enhance the published
English reports, for example by correcting errors, by clarifying
"through unreported factual detail," by revealing "unreported
portions of judges' opinions" and "undelivered opinions," and by
showing "cooperation, collegiality or friction among the judges."22 4
Oldham later published an edition of the legal manuscripts of one
of those English judges, the great Lord Mansfield.225 What The
Mansfield Manuscripts did for Lord Mansfield and the history of
English law in the eighteenth century, a publication of Tucker's law
papers might do, perhaps on a less monumental scale, for the
Virginia judge and the history of American law in the early
republic.
220. Carter's Ex'r v. Currie (May 17, 1804), in 2 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 18, nbk.
11, at 43.
221. St. George Tucker, Court of Appeals docket (May 1804), in Folder 8, Tucker-Coleman
Papers (located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary).
222. Compare Hawkins's Ex'rs v. Minor Ex'r of Berkeley, 9 Va. (5 Call) 118, 120 (1804),
with Hawkin's Ex'rs v. Minor, Ex'r of Berkeley (May 10, 1804), in 2 Tucker, Case Notes,
supra note 18, nbk. 11, at 6-7.
223. Compare Bronaugh & Co. v. Scott (May 18, 1804), in 2 Tucker, Case Notes, supra
note 18, nbk. 11, at 19-21, Hooe v. Wilson (May 16, 1804), in 2 Tucker, Case Notes, supra
note 18, nbk. 11, at 12,16-18, and Johnson's Ex'rs v. Pendleton (May 4, 1804), with Bronaugh
& Co. v. Scott, 9 Va. (5 Call) 78 (1804), Hooe v. Wilson, 9 Va. (5 Call) 61 (1804), and Johnson
v. Pendleton, 9 Va. (5 Call) 128 (1804).
224. James Oldham, Eighteenth-Century Judges'Notes: How They Explain, Correct and
Enhance the Reports, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 9, 10 (1987).
225. See 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH
LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1992).
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